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Foreword 
The government's identity card proposals have far-reaching implications. The creation 
of a nation-wide population database on such a scale and with such complexity has 
rarely been attempted anywhere in the world.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
proposals have sparked a lively debate throughout British society. 
 
The Government asserts that its version of a national identity system offers the potential 
to combat the threat of terrorism, identity fraud and illegal working.  Critics of the 
proposals warn that the scheme is fraught with challenges and pitfalls. It is of utmost 
importance that we reconcile these views and find a constructive way forward. 
 
Six months ago the LSE began a wide-ranging research project intended to resolve these 
issues. More than a hundred experts, business leaders, and research staff from across the 
LSE joined forces with colleagues throughout the world to produce a comprehensive 
analysis of the scheme's implications. 
 
The report's conclusions are first, that, the scheme will involve considerable 
expenditure. Second, the proposals will alter the nature of British society. The proposals 
involve important choices that necessitate a wide ranging national dialogue.  The LSE's 
report is an important contribution to that dialogue. 
 
The report also outlines a possible alternative system that promises to be flexible, less 
expensive and as friendly to civil liberties and privacy as any card system can be in the 
modern age. It also creates a consumer based platform for the development of e-
government and e-commerce services. 
 
We hope the government will be prepared to reflect on the analysis, and the 
implications for their own proposals. 
 
 
Howard Davies 
Director, LSE 
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Preface 
I welcome the report commissioned and undertaken by the LSE as a valuable 
contribution to an issue which engages significant data protection and privacy concerns. 
I have expressed my unease that the current proposal to establish a national 
identification system is founded on an extensive central register of personal information 
controlled by government and is disproportionate to the stated objectives behind the 
introduction of ID cards. It raises substantial data protection concerns about the extent 
of the information recorded about an individual when the ID card is used in their day to 
day lives and sparks fears about the potential for wider use/access to this information in 
the future. 
 
In my response to the government’s original consultation on ID cards I made clear my 
concern that alternative methods of identity management had not been fully explored. I 
am pleased that this report has been able to identify a blueprint for a national identity 
system that does not involve the creation of an extensive central register and 
government held data trail of each time a card is used. The report makes clear that a 
system which minimises the amount of personal information generated and held by the 
government on card holders can be established without sacrificing the essential 
attributes of security, reliability and trust in the system. 
 
I hope that during the scrutiny of the ID Cards Bill, as it passes through the 
parliamentary process, this report helps focus debate on the actual system for 
administering ID cards and the need to ensure that this is one which is proportionate to 
the reasons for wishing to introduce ID cards. Eradicating unnecessary personal 
information and ensuring that individuals, rather than government, have appropriate 
control over how their personal information is handled will go a long way towards 
achieving the essential pre-requisite of establishing a system that inspires full public 
confidence: one where individuals can be correctly identified when they really need to 
be rather than one which has the intrusive side effect of the government  identifying and 
recording  information about how individuals go about their daily lives. This welcome 
report demonstrates that such objectives should be achievable in practice. It deserves a 
wide audience and its findings careful consideration. 
 
 
 
 
Richard Thomas 
Information Commissioner 
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Summary of Conclusions 
The Report concludes that the establishment of a secure national identity system has the 
potential to create significant, though limited, benefits for society. However, the 
proposals currently being considered by Parliament are neither safe nor appropriate. 
There was an overwhelming view expressed by stakeholders involved in this Report that 
the proposals are too complex, technically unsafe, overly prescriptive and lack a 
foundation of public trust and confidence. The current proposals miss key opportunities 
to establish a secure, trusted and cost-effective identity system and the Report therefore 
considers alternative models for an identity card scheme that may achieve the goals of 
the legislation more effectively. The concept of a national identity system is 
supportable, but the current proposals are not feasible. 
 
Many of the public interest objectives of the Bill would be more effectively achieved by 
other means. For example, preventing identity theft may be better addressed by giving 
individuals greater control over the disclosure of their own personal information, while 
prevention of terrorism may be more effectively managed through strengthened border 
patrols and increased presence at borders, or allocating adequate resources for 
conventional police intelligence work. 
 
The technology envisioned for this scheme is, to a large extent, untested and unreliable. 
No scheme on this scale has been undertaken anywhere in the world. Smaller and less 
ambitious systems have encountered substantial technological and operational problems 
that are likely to be amplified in a large-scale, national system. The use of biometrics 
gives rise to particular concern because this technology has never been used at such a 
scale. 
 
We estimate the likely cost of the ten-year rollout of the proposed identity cards scheme 
will be between £10.6 billion and £19.2 billion, with a median of £14.5 billion. This 
figure does not include public or private sector integration costs, nor does it take into 
account possible cost overruns.  
 
Any system that supports critical security functions must be robust and resilient to 
malicious attacks. Because of its size and complexity, the identity system would require 
security measures at a scale that will result in substantially higher implementation and 
operational costs than has been estimated. The proposed use of the system for a variety 
of purposes, and access to it from a large number of private and public sector 
organisations will require unprecedented attention to security. 
 
All identity systems carry consequential dangers as well as potential benefits. 
Depending on the model used, identity systems may create a range of new and 
unforeseen problems. These include the failure of systems, unforeseen financial costs, 
increased security threats and unacceptable imposition on citizens. The success of a 
national identity system depends on a sensitive, cautious and cooperative approach 
involving all key stakeholder groups including an independent and rolling risk 
assessment and a regular review of management practices. We are not confident that 
these conditions have been satisfied in the development of the Identity Cards Bill. The 
risk of failure in the current proposals is therefore magnified to the point where the 
scheme should be regarded as a potential danger to the public interest and to the legal 
rights of individuals. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
The introduction of a national identity system will herald a significant shift in Britain’s 
social and economic environment. Many fundamental concepts such as privacy, 
anonymity and the individual’s accountability to government will be repositioned. The 
potential for merging, matching and sharing of personal information across the private 
and public sector will be made possible. For better or worse, the relationship between 
the individual and the State will change. 
 
Surprisingly little research has been undertaken with specific reference to the identity 
card legislation currently being considered by Parliament. The aim of this study is to 
provide a comprehensive review of the Bill, to assess the costs and implications arising 
from its provisions, and to suggest areas for improvement. 
 
There appear to be some significant potential benefits to the UK in adopting a 
harmonised system of identification. However, the risks and the financial implications 
for business and for individuals may be substantial. In producing this report we have 
kept foremost in mind the potential to create an identity system with limited cost and 
risk, but one that brings the maximum benefit to individuals and society. 
 
This report is based on research of available evidence. It does not deal with principle or 
speculation.  
 
There is a surprising degree of agreement between the findings of this report and the 
conclusions of the Home Affairs Committee on the draft Identity Cards Bill. This report 
agrees in whole or part with 79 of the 85 relevant recommendations in the HAC report 
(these are set out in detail in Appendix 1). This concurrence is a crucial test of the 
strength and validity of both reports. 
 
This Report provides a comprehensive foundation for further debate about many key 
aspects of the government's proposals. Over the coming months we will continue to 
build on these findings to assess a wider range of issues relating to the impact and 
implications of an identity scheme for the UK. 
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2 
Conclusions in Detail 
Overview 
This Report assesses the implications, costs, opportunities and consequences arising 
from current legislative proposals to introduce a national identity card scheme. The 
Report does not challenge or debate the principles that underpin the proposals. The 
goals of combating terrorism, reducing crime and illegal working, reducing fraud and 
strengthening national security are accepted a priori as legitimate responsibilities of 
government. The report does, however, challenge assumptions that an identity card 
system is an appropriate, safe and cost-effective way to achieve those goals. 
 
The Report concludes that the establishment of a secure national identity system has the 
potential to create significant, though limited, benefits for society. Secure identity, if 
implemented in the right way, can reduce identity fraud and promote the development 
of the e-commerce environment. However, the proposals currently being considered by 
Parliament are neither safe nor appropriate. There was an overwhelming view expressed 
by stakeholders, experts and researchers involved in this Report that the proposals are 
too complex, technically unsafe, overly prescriptive and lack a foundation of public trust 
and confidence. The current proposals miss key opportunities to establish a secure, 
trusted and cost-effective identity system.  
 
There is no evidence to support the use of identity fraud as a justification for the current 
identity card model. Many of the claims made about the prevalence of identity fraud are 
without foundation. A card system such as the one proposed in the Bill may even lead to 
a greater incidence of identity fraud. 
 
The concept of a national identity system is supportable, but the current proposals are 
not feasible. The Report therefore outlines an alternative model for an identity card 
scheme that will achieve the goals of the legislation more effectively.  
 
The Government seems intent on pointing to international obligations and precedents to 
justify the introduction of a national identity card. Our research indicates that a national 
identity card need not resemble the one that the Government is proposing, nor is any 
nation under an obligation to create such a card. Indeed, no other country has done so 
with such a pretext. 
 
An appropriate identity system for the United Kingdom would be one based on a 
foundation of public trust and user demand rather than one based on enforcement 
through criminal and civil penalties. The goal of public trust would be made possible, in 
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part, through the use of reliable and secure technologies and the creation of a more 
flexible “citizen centred” model. 
 
The remainder of this summary outlines the key areas of concern with the proposals as 
they stand. Each point is discussed in more detail in the main report. 
Purposes of the system 
The current proposals seek to address multiple, divergent goals, yet the evidence from 
other national schemes indicates that identity systems perform best when established for 
clear and focused purposes. The goal of “prevention or detention of crime”, for 
example, involves a potentially huge number of applications and functions that may not 
be appropriate for an identity system that also seeks to achieve a goal of public services 
delivery. 
 
Equally, many of the public interest objectives of the Bill would be more effectively 
achieved by other means. For example, preventing identity fraud may be better 
addressed by giving individuals greater control over the disclosure of their own personal 
information, while prevention of terrorism may be more effectively managed through 
strengthened border patrols and increased presence at borders, or allocating adequate 
resources for conventional police intelligence work. 
 
We accept that there is some evidence that the government’s scheme could be used as a 
means of combating illegal working, though measures have already been put in place to 
address this issue. Beyond these existing measures, an identity card is unlikely to 
achieve any significant effect  
 
We also accept that the proposed scheme is likely to have an impact on false identity 
within the benefits sector. However, the government has already put in place vetting 
regimes that are rigorous and effective. Benefit fraud through false identity is relatively 
rare and we believe the cost of introducing an identity card in the benefits environment 
would far outweigh any savings that could be made. 
The technological environment 
The technology envisioned for this scheme is, to a large extent, untested and unreliable. 
No scheme on this scale has been undertaken anywhere in the world. Smaller and less 
ambitious systems have encountered substantial technological and operational problems 
that are likely to be amplified in a large-scale, national system. The use of biometrics 
gives rise to particular concern because this technology has never been used at such a 
scale. 
 
The proposed system unnecessarily introduces, at a national level, a new tier of 
technological and organisational infrastructure that will carry associated risks of failure. 
A fully integrated national system of this complexity and importance will be 
technologically precarious and could itself become a target for attacks by terrorists or 
others.   
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From a security perspective, the approach to identity verification outlined in the Identity 
Cards Bill is substantially – perhaps fatally – flawed. In consequence, the National 
Identity Register may itself pose a far larger risk to the safety and security of UK 
citizens than any of the problems that it is intended to address. 
Cost 
Any system that supports critical security functions must be robust and resilient to 
malicious attacks. Because of its size and complexity, the identity system will require 
security measures at a scale that will result in substantially higher implementation and 
operational costs than has been estimated. The proposed use of the system for a variety 
of purposes, and access to it from a large number of private and public sector 
organisations will require unprecedented attention to security. 
 
We estimate the likely cost of the ten-year rollout of the proposed identity cards scheme 
will be between £10.6 billion and £19.2 billion, with a median of £14.5 billion. This 
figure does not include public or private sector integration costs, nor does it take into 
account possible cost overruns.  
 
 Low Median High
Issuing Identity Cards Over a 10-Year Period 814 1015 1216
Passports (Based on Passport Service Figures) 3936 3936 4065
Readers for Public Sector (As Specified in the Bill) 291 306 317
National Identity Register 1559 2169 2910
Managing the National Identity Register 2261 3658 5341
Staff Costs Over a 10-Year Period 1719 3368 5308
Miscellaneous 22 64 117
TOTAL 10602 14516 19274
The National Identity Scheme – Projected Costs (All figures £’m) 
Private sector costs relating to the verification of individuals may account for a sum 
equal to or greater than the headline cost figure suggested by the government. Staff 
must be trained to use biometric systems, and in larger organisations must be on hand at 
all times to verify customers and new employees. New facilities may have to be built to 
accommodate applicants who feel sensitive about having their biometrics taken in 
public areas. 
 
The government has substantially underestimated the cost of biometric readers. Because 
of physical irregularity or mental impairment, a significant number of people are unable 
to provide a stable biometric unless expensive equipment is used. 
 
The cost of registration of applicants appears to have been underestimated. The Bill 
makes provision for the disclosure and processing of more than fifty sources of 
identification. This element, coupled with the capture of biometrics and the 
investigation of the biographical history of applicants, may result in registration alone 
costing more than the projected overall cost of the identity system. 
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The direct cost to people applying to be registered on the system is also likely to be 
higher than anticipated. Biometric registration may have to be repeated every five years 
for much of the population. As people age, their biometrics change and become less 
reliable. As a consequence, these people are more likely to face problems with the use 
of the identity card system and may require more frequent updates of their biometric 
information stored on the system. Approximately 17 per cent of the population are aged 
over 65 and will fall into this growing class, as will such people as the visually 
handicapped and those with mental impairment. The implications for reliability, cost 
and trust in the proposed identity system are significant. 
 
One possible solution to these problems is the endemic use of multiple biometrics. 
However, this feature would add significantly to the cost of the system. 
The legal environment 
In its current form, the Identity Cards Bill appears to be unsafe in law. A number of 
elements potentially compromise Article 8 (privacy) and Article 14 (discrimination) of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
Because of the difficulty that some individuals may face in registering or verifying their 
biometrics there is a potential conflict with national laws such as the Disability 
Discrimination Act and the Race Relations Act. 
 
The proposals appear to be in direct conflict with the Data Protection Act. Many of 
these conflicts arise from the creation of a national identity register, which will contain 
a substantial amount of personal data, some of which would be highly sensitive. The 
amount of information contained in the register, the purposes for which it can be used, 
the breadth of organisations that will have access to the Register and the oversight 
arrangements proposed are contentious aspects. 
 
The compulsory acquisition of fingerprints in passports may violate the common law 
right to exit and re-enter the UK. This common law right of each UK citizen is now 
enshrined in the Immigration Act, which does provide for exceptions. However, if a 
right to leave the UK exists and a passport is a prerequisite, then a right to a passport 
must exist also, subject to those exceptions. That right would likely be hindered if new 
biometrics were introduced. The Act’s exceptions are aimed in spirit at immigration 
control of foreign nationals, not control of UK citizens leaving the country. 
 
The Bill also creates a possible conflict with the right of freedom of movement 
throughout the EU for EU citizens. It is arguable that the Identity Cards Bill may 
discourage non-UK EU workers from coming to the UK to work and so may infringe 
EU principles on the freedom of movement of workers. Furthermore, EU Directive 
68/360 governing the rights and conditions of entry and residence for workers may 
make it unlawful for the government to require non-UK EU citizens to obtain a UK 
identity card as a condition of residence.  
 
Liability and responsibility for maintaining accuracy of data on the Register, conducting 
identity checks and ensuring the integrity of the overall operation of the scheme has not 
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been resolved. The legislation places requirements on individuals and organisations that 
are substantial and wide-ranging, and yet no indication has been given relating to how 
liability would be established, who would assess that liability, or who would police it.  
Oversight 
The oversight arrangements set out in the Bill appear to be inadequate in several key 
respects. An Identity Cards Commissioner as envisioned by the legislation may be an 
insufficient mechanism to adequately promote public trust.  
 
The current population of oversight bodies in the UK is complex, inefficient and 
frequently in conflict. Commissioners responsible for various aspects of privacy and 
surveillance, for example, rarely cooperate with each other. Reform of the oversight 
process rather than the addition of more oversight agencies might be the most effective 
way forward.  
International obligations 
The Government has consistently asserted that that biometrics proposals, both in the 
new UK passport format and in the identity cards legislation, is a harmonising measure 
required by international obligations, and is thus no different to the plans and intentions 
of the UK’s international partners. There is no evidence to support this assertion. 
 
We find that the Government is unnecessarily binding the identity card scheme to 
internationally recognised requirements on passport documents. By doing so, the 
Government has failed to correctly interpret international standards, generating 
unnecessary costs, using untested technologies and going well beyond the measures 
adopted in any other country that seeks to meet international obligations. Even in 
countries with identity cards, numerous safeguards prevent the development of a system 
similar to the one proposed here.  We were unable to identify any country that 
established identity cards through an open parliamentary process.   
Alternative scenarios 
One alternative to the proposed scheme would be to permit a wider range of practical 
applications for day-to-day dealings with businesses. This scenario would make use of 
purpose-specific identity technologies that would give consumers a more secure and 
simple means of accessing commercial organisations in an electronic environment such 
as the Internet. By offering direct consumer benefits as well as government services, 
such systems could assist in securing public support for the scheme. 
 
In considering performance of more limited identity schemes in other countries, and the 
possible applications and limitations of technologies available now or in the near future, 
it is likely that the benefits to individuals and business from the UK scheme are 
extremely limited.  
 
This report concludes that the proposals currently being considered by Parliament do 
not represent the most appropriate, secure, cost effective or practical identity system for 
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the United Kingdom. The system outlined by the legislation appears unlikely therefore 
to achieve its stated objectives. 
 
All identity systems carry consequential dangers as well as potential benefits. 
Depending on the model used, identity systems may create a range of new and 
unforeseen problems. These include the failure of systems, unforeseen financial costs, 
increased security threats and unacceptable imposition on citizens. The success of a 
national identity system depends on a sensitive, cautious and cooperative approach 
involving all key stakeholder groups including an independent and rolling risk 
assessment and a regular review of management practices. We are not confident that 
these conditions have been satisfied in the development of the Identity Cards Bill. The 
risk of failure in the current proposals is therefore magnified to the point where the 
scheme should be regarded as a potential danger to the public interest and to the legal 
rights of individuals. 
